Introduction to Philosophy, Fourth Edition, is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Building on the exceptionally successful tradition of previous editions, this edition for the first time incorporates the insights of a new coeditor, John Martin Fischer, and has been updated and revised to make it more accessible. Ideal for introductory philosophy courses, the text includes sections on the meaning of life, God and evil, knowledge and reality, the philosophy of science, the mind/body (...) problem, freedom of will, consciousness, ethics, and philosophical puzzles and paradoxes. It presents seventy substantial--and in some cases complete--selections from the best and most influential works in philosophy, offering a unique balance between classical and contemporary material. An extensive glossary of philosophical terms is also included. The fourth edition features fifteen new readings, including work by Albert Camus, Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel Dennett, Harry G. Frankfurt, William Paley, Derek Parfit, John Perry, Richard Taylor, Peter Van Inwagen, Bernard Williams, and Susan Wolf. Part III, Knowledge and Reality, has been restructured and now includes Plato's Thaetetus, selections by Edmund L. Gettier and Robert Nozick, and an essay by Christopher Grau that explores the philosophical concepts presented in the popular film The Matrix. Two new ethics puzzles--"The Trolley Problem" and "Ducking Harm and Sacrificing Others"--are also included. This edition incorporates Study Questions after each reading and is accompanied by an Instructor's CD and a Student Companion Website, both containing helpful resources. (shrink)

Robert Gordon’s trip to the Mogok ruby mines in northern Burma, as reported in his testament to the Royal Geographical Society in 1888, represents one of the most blatant uses of travel as empire building in the Mekong Region. While European explorers and adventurers had been travelling to and along the region for centuries, most had been intent on mapping, surveying and categorizing its contents for purposes of their own profit, in one way or another. Gordon, while of course not (...) unmindful of his own career, represents the traveller aiming to be of service to the greater power. He was strongly motivated by the desire to bring the ruby mines of Mogok into the reach of the British Empire through the building of a railway and the necessary infrastructure to pacify the countryside and its people, thereby enabling the enclosure of another type of commons. (shrink)

The Burford Nursing Development Unit Holistic Model offers a conceptually radical alternative to 'traditional' models, emphasizing the nurse-patient relationship, which is considered essential for therapeutic nursing. This has led to questions as to whether aspects of psychosocial care is adequately framed within the nursing process format or whether it can in fact be continued by 'other' nurses. Part One of this book describes the original philosophy behind this innovative model and how it was adapted for use. Part Two outlines the (...) practical use of the model in the form of case studies, using critical analysis to test its current validity. Its use is also compared against previous models. (shrink)

Reflection is widely recognised as an invaluable tool in health care, providing fresh insights which enable practitioners to develop their own practice and improve the quality of their care. This book introduces the practitioner to the concept of 'Guided reflection', an innovative research process in which the practitioner is assisted by a mentor (or 'guide') in a process of self-enquiry, development, and learning through reflection, in order to become fully effective. Guided reflection is grounded in individual practice, and can provide (...) deeply meaningful insights into self-development and professional care. The process results in a relexive narrative, which highlights key issues for enhancing health care practice and professional care. This book uses a collection of such narratives from everyday clinical practice in nursing, health visiting and midwifery to demonstrate the theory and practicalities of guided reflection and narrative construction. These narratives portray the values inherent in caring, highlight key issues in clinical practice, reveal the factors that constrain the quest to realise practice, and examine the ways practitioners work towards overcoming these constraints. (shrink)

The concept of right (jus) as a moral power is traced in Leibniz's earliest to latest philosophical work.

From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behaviour, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the scepticism of many philosophers who have argued that 'free will' is impossible under 'scientific determinism'. This scepticism is best overcome, according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that (...) is by establishing that actions are constituted by behavourial events with the appropriate kind of mental causal history. He sets out a rich and subtle argument for such a theory and defends it against its critics. Thus the book demonstrates the importance of philosophical work in action theory for the central metaphysical task of understanding our place in nature. (shrink)

Each day, nurse practitioners are faced with clinical situations and dilemmas that have no obvious right answers. This article sets out the process of ethical mapping as a reflective device to enable practitioners to reflect on dilemmas of practice in order to learn through the experience and inform future practice. Ethical mapping is illustrated around a single experience that an intensive care practitioner shared in an ongoing guided reflection relationship. Within this process the practitioner draws on ethical principles to inform (...) the particular situation, notably autonomy, doing harm, truth telling and advocacy. Through reflection, ethical principles are transcended and assimilated into knowing in practice, enabling the practitioner to become more ethically sensitive in responding to future situations. (shrink)

Exploring reflection -- Writing self : the 1st dialogical movement -- Surfing the reflective spiral : the 2nd dialogical movement -- Framing insights -- The dance with Sophia : the 3rd dialogical movement -- Guiding reflection : the 4th dialogical movement -- Weaving narrative and performance : the 5th & 6th dialogical movements -- The reflective curriculum -- Reflections on touch and the environment -- Reflections on caring -- Life begins at 40 -- Balancing the wind or a lot of (...) hot air -- A reflective model of clinical practice -- Reflective leadership -- Teetering on the edge of chaos -- Ensuring quality (clinical standards and clinical audit) -- Clinical supervision -- Tales of clinical supervision -- Therapeutic journaling with patients -- The bully and the sheep : storyboard -- Reflective prose poems -- Through a glass darkly : the performance turn. (shrink)

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(2013). Leibniz, Pufendorf, and the Possibility of Moral Self-Governance. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 281-301. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.693064.

Es ist weitgehend anerkannt, dass sich Leibniz' praktische Philosophie fest auf teleologische Prinzipien (Vollkommenheit, Glückseligkeit), affektive Faktoren (Freude, Liebe) wie auch intellektuelle Tugenden (Wissen, Weisheit) gründet. Tatsächlich definiert Leibniz Weisheit als „die Wissenschaft von der Glückseligkeit" und Gerechtigkeit letztlich als „die Liebe des Wissenden" (caritas sapientis). Jedoch argumentiere ich in dieser Arbeit, dass Leibniz' praktische Philosophie auf die deontologischen Kategorien von Recht (ius) und Verpflichtung (obligatio) gegründet ist. Diese Kategorien, eingeführt in einer der frühesten Arbeiten von Leibniz, den Nova Methodus (...) Discendae Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667), bezeichnen die moralischen Qualitäten einer rationalen Substanz, d. h. die moralische Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit einer Person, gerecht zu handeln. Von dieser a-priori-Begründung leitet Leibniz materielle und gesetzliche Rechte und Verpflichtungen, seine bekannten drei Regeln des Rechten wie auch das Wesen der „Allgemeinen Nützlichkeit" ab. Im Wesentlichen bezeichnen die deontologischen Kategorien die Selbst-Begrenzung der Freiheit einer Person, d. h. ihre innere Fähigkeit, ihre Ziele vereinbar mit und nutzbringend für alle anderen rationalen Wesen zu machen. Ich werde zeigen, dass Leibniz' viel spätere teleologische Prinzipien ohne diese, wenig beachtete deontische Begründung nicht richtig verstanden werden. (shrink)

This paper maintains that Hobbes grounds right and obligation in self-interest, and opposes a recent argument that for Hobbes obligation is grounded in the agent’s practical deliberation. In addition, it maintains that for Leibniz right and obligation are grounded in the moral-rational capacity of persons, but not in self-interest. It proceeds by distinguishing among the various senses of jus or “right,” and contrasting Hobbes’s and Leibniz’s understanding of the term—though both see it as a kind of freedom they differ fundamentally (...) as to its kind. The little explored treatment of “right” that appears in Leibniz’s New Method for the Learning and Teaching of Jurisprudence is discussed in the course of the article. In conclusion, the article finds that for Leibniz, obligations are grounded in one’s moral capacity. One ought not to harm others because one is a rational being among others who hold the same rights and obligations. For Hobbes, obligations are grounded in self-preservation and maintained by external coercion. For Leibniz, right is the possibility of doing what is just, maintaining the rights and obligations of others; while for Hobbes, right is a problem for doing what is just—a problem for self-interested agents that requires an external solution. (shrink)

Communication Theories for Everyday Life introduces readers to the complexities of theories in communication studies, mass communication, and public relations, emphasizing their connection to everyday life. Instead of utilizing a "theory-a-day" approach, this text cuts across content areas and clusters related theories, making them easier for readers to process and apply to real-life situations. Communication Theories for Everyday Life also addresses theories in emerging areas and growing fields, such as media research, organizational communication, and computer-mediated communication, while still featuring the (...) traditional theories that always have defined the field. Features: Contextualizes theory with an introductory chapter in each of the main content areas that introduces the theories and research in the field, showing students how the theories developed. Features new theories and subject areas not present in most traditional communication theory textbooks, including new interactive technologies, feminist scholarship, British cultural studies, semiotics, postmodernism, and critical race theory. Emphasizes the application of some theories across many subject areas through headings in the form of questions that encourage students to process material and explore for themselves how theories and content apply to their lives. Uses case-study chapters that demonstrate to students how each subject area would use theory to solve or understand issues in everyday life. Reviews theories for the three main genres of communication - communication studies, mass communication, and public relations - with balanced coverage, examining the unique contributions each area has made to the field of communication as a whole. Page 1 of 1. (shrink)

Philosophers and logicians use the term “indexical” for words such as “I”, “you” and “tomorrow”. Demonstratives such as “this” and “that” and demonstratives phrases such as “this man” and “that computer” are usually reckoned as a subcategory of indexicals. (Following [Kaplan, 1989a].) The “context-dependence” of indexicals is often taken as a defining feature: what an indexical designates shifts from context to context. But there are many kinds of shiftiness, with corresponding conceptions of context. Until we clarify what we mean by (...) “context”, this defining feature remains unclear. In sections 1–3, which are largely drawn from [Perry, forthcoming(a)], I try to clarify the sense in which indexicals are context-dependent and make some distinctions among the ways indexicals depend on context. In sections 3–6, I contrast indexicality with another phenomenon that I call “unarticulated constituents.”. (shrink)

Perry argues that certain sorts of indexicals are 'essential', in the sense that they cannot be eliminated in favor of descriptions. This paper also introduces the influential idea that certain sorts of indexicals play a special role in thought, and have a special connection to action.

A collection of twelve essays by John Perry and two essays he co-authored, this book deals with various problems related to "self-locating beliefs": the sorts of beliefs one expresses with indexicals and demonstratives, like "I" and "this." Postscripts have been added to a number of the essays discussing criticisms by authors such as Gareth Evans and Robert Stalnaker. Included with such well-known essays as "Frege on Demonstratives," "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," "From Worlds to Situations," and "The (...) Prince and the Phone Booth" are a number of important essays that have been less accessible and that discuss important aspects of Perry's views, referred to as "Critical Referentialism," on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

My aim in this study is not to praise Fischer's fine theory of moral responsibility, but to (try to) bury the “semi” in “semicompatibilism”. I think Fischer gives the Consequence Argument (CA) too much credit, and gives himself too little credit. In his book, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer gave the CA as good a statement as it will ever get, and put his finger on what is wrong with it. Then he declared stalemate rather than victory. In my (...) view, Fischer’s view amounts to sophisticated compatibilism. It would be nice to be able to call it by its right name. In The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer develops his own version of Consequence Argument, which turns on two principles, one of which is the fixity of the past. FP: For any action Y, agent S and time t, if it is true that is S were to do Y at t, some fact about that past relative to t would not have been a fact, then S cannot at t do Y at t. I argue that the equipment needed to reject FP (and thereby defend the most plausible version of compatibilism) is needed to deal with the problem of fatalism. In addition, I argue that the rejection of FP is compatible with Fischer’s approach to Frankfurt cases and with his account of transfer principles. (shrink)

Following his recently expanded _The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays,_ John Perry develops a reflexive-referential' account of indexicals, demonstratives and proper names. On these issues the philosophy of language in the twentieth century was shaped by two competing traditions, descriptivist and referentialist. Oddly, the classic referentialist texts of the 1970s by Kripke, Donnellan, Kaplan and others were seemingly refuted almost a century earlier by co-reference and no-reference problems raised by Russell and Frege. Perry's theory, (...) borrowing ideas from both traditions as well as from Burks and Reichenbach, diagnoses the problems as stemming from a fixation on a certain kind of content, coined referential or fully incremental. Referentialist tradition is portrayed as holding that indexicals contribute content that involves individuals without identifying conditions on them; descriptivist tradition is portrayed as holding that referential content does not explain all of the identifying conditions conveyed by names and indexicals. Perry reveals a coherent and structured family of contents — from reflexive contents that place conditions on their actual utterance to fully incremental contents that place conditions only on the objects of reference — reconciling the legitimate insights of both traditions. (shrink)

When you use the word “I” it designates you; when I use the same word, it designates me. If you use “you” talking to me, it designates me; when I use it talking to you, it designates you. “I” and “you” are indexicals. The designation of an indexical shifts from speaker to speaker, time to time, place to place. Different utterances of the same indexical designate different things, because what is designated depends not only on the meaning associated with the (...) expression, but also on facts about the utterance. An utterance of “I” designates the person who utters it; an utterance of “you” designates the person to whom it is addressed, an utterance of “here” designates the place at which the utterance is made, and so forth. Because indexicals shift their designation in this way, sentences containing indexicals can be used to say different things on different occasions. Suppose you say to me, “You are wrong and I am right about reference,” and I reply with the same sentence. We have used the same sentence, with the same meaning, but said quite different and incompatible things. (shrink)

Contents PART I: INTRODUCTION 1 John Perry: The Problem of Personal Identity, 3 PART II: VERSIONS OF THE MEMORY THEORY 2 John Locke: Of Identity and ...

Demonstratives seem to have posed a severe difficulty for Frege’s philosophy of language, to which his doctrine of incommunicable senses was a reaction. In “The Thought,” Frege briefly discusses sentences containing such demonstratives as “today,” “here,” and “yesterday,” and then turns to certain questions that he says are raised by the occurrence of “I” in sentences (T, 24-26). He is led to say that, when one thinks about oneself, one grasps thoughts that others cannot grasp, that cannot be communicated. However, (...) nothing could be more out of the spirit of Frege’s account of sense and thought than an incommunicable, private thought. In the first part of the paper, I explain the problem demonstratives pose for Frege, and explore three ways he might have dealt with it. I argue that none of these ways provides Frege with a solution to his problem consistent with his philosophy of language. The first two are plausible as solutions, but contradict his identification of the sense expressed by a sentence with a thought. The third preserves the identification, but is implausible. In the second part, I suggest that Frege was led to his doctrine of incommunicable senses as a result of some appreciation of the difficulties his account of demonstratives faces, for these come quickly to the surface when we think about “I.” I argue that incommunicable senses won’t help. I end by trying to identify the central problem with Frege’s approach, and sketching an alternative. (shrink)

A defense of antecedent physicalism, which argues against the idea that if everything that goes on in the universe is physical, our consciousness and feelings ..

RECENT STUDIES OF CHRISTIANITY'S RELATION TO LIBERAL POLITICS HAVE recognized the importance of specifying clearly what type of liberalism is being considered. Jeffrey Stout's critique is one such example. Unfortunately, Stout fails to engage the one thinker who arguably is the most influential in how Americans relate Christianity and politics: John Locke. Political arguments of today's Christians are premised, often unconsciously, on rival interpretations of Locke's political theology.

No word in English is shorter than the word I.' And yet no word is more important in philosophy. When Descartes said I think therefore I am' he produced something that was both about himself and a universal formula. The word I' is called an indexical' because its meaning always depends on who says it. Other examples of indexicals are you,' here,' this' and now.' John Perry discusses how these kinds of words work, and why they express important (...) philosophical thoughts. He shows that indexicals pose a challenge to traditional assumptions about language and thought. Over the years a number of these papers, now included in this book, have sparked lively debates and have been influential in philosophy, linguistics and other areas of cognitive science. With seven new papers, including the previously unpublished What Are Indexicals?,' the present volume expands on an earlier version of this book published in the early nineties. Also included are the well-known papers Frege on Demonstratives,' Cognitive Significance and New Theories of Reference,' Evading the Slingshot,' The Prince and the Phone booth', Fodor on Psychological Explanations', and related papers on situation semantics, direct reference, and the structure of belief. This book also includes afterwords written by the author that discuss responses to his work by Gareth Evans, Robert Stalnaker, Barbara Partee, Howard Wettstein and others. (shrink)